Putin goes to Pyongyang: Should we be worried?

In Pyongyang last month Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a new strategic treaty with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

This was Putin’s first visit to Pyongyang in 24 years, in contrast to the more regular pattern of visits to Russia by the three Kim dynasty leaders – almost always by armoured train. Kim’s grandfather founded the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948 with significant military and political support from the Soviet Union. While not deferential, the Kims have trodden carefully with their benefactors ever since.

Fast forward to 2024. Photos of the two smiling leaders underlined a historic partnership – but also pointed to their differences in age, culture, temperament, and the size, wealth and capabilities of their respective nations.

Russian and DPRK media proclaimed the 19 June Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership would afford “mutual assistance in case of aggression against one of the parties”. Putin affirmed that Russia “does not rule out military-technical cooperation” with the DPRK, and promised cooperation on space exploration, food supply, and nuclear energy. Three months earlier, Russia had ceased adherence to UN sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear program.

There is speculation that Putin is seeking to bolster Russia’s arms cache as the war in Ukraine grinds on. North Korea has developed weapons manufacturing and exports – missiles and ammunition suitable for use by Russian forces – built on earlier Soviet assistance, an on-going source of regime income.

Current assessments are that 4.8 million artillery shells and some 24 ballistic missiles have been shipped across the far-northern Eurasian continent to Russia. Kim, who exports North Korean labourers to construction zones around the world to earn remittances, also appears willing to provide cannon-fodder DPRK soldiers to Russia’s Ukraine war front.

In exchange, Russia may be willing to bolster North Korea’s nuclear weapons program with expertise, technology and materials. Unsurprisingly, this possibility has alarmed Seoul and triggered a joint repudiation by South Korea, Japan and the United States, released within days of Putin’s Pyongyang visit. The South Korean president’s office also announced a review of an earlier decision not to provide military aid to Ukraine.

So, is Putin courting North Korea from a position of power, perhaps aiming to invigorate an alliance network from a bygone era? Or is this an act of desperation? No doubt the North Korean ammunition is welcome, but Putin appears far from desperate. North Korea remains one of a small number of client states for Russia, one with benefits to offer.

Kim is clearly responding to Putin from a position of economic weakness, but North Korea has strategic cards to play. Kim’s regime has two deterrents against US retaliation: proximity to Seoul, a glittering metropolis just 60 kilometres from the DPRK border, and nuclear weapons capable of being mounted on long-range missiles. In addition, both Russia and North Korea boast advanced cyber capabilities that have for two decades enabled brazen attacks on Western interests.

With the strategic landscape so unpredictable, the Putin–Kim pact presents real threats to Western interests across Europe and the Indo-Pacific. But what is the potential for those threats to backfire?

Seoul’s about-face on supplying weapons to Ukraine, and the resounding repudiation of the Russia–DPRK pact by South Korea, Japan and the United States – difficult to secure given historic Seoul–Tokyo grievances – are significant. As is the fact that Finland and Sweden have overturned their longstanding adherence to military neutrality to join NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Could Putin’s and Kim’s respective nuclear strike threats be exposed as empty? There are 28,000 US troops on the Korean Peninsula, in addition to an impressive South Korean military. North Korean forces, while numerous, are comparatively weak. DPRK satellite and missile test failures periodically suggest the bellicosity from Pyongyang is unwarranted. Its nuclear weapons deterrent remains crucial to its survival. Kim, and his father before him, have undoubtedly maximised the potential impact of their meagre assets over the decades. We should assume North Korea’s weapons programs are developing and effective.

Would Putin risk stretching his forces by intentionally triggering a war in Eastern Asia? While Russia’s Exercise Vostok 2022 was joined by 13 countries including China, such displays do not portend war. Russia’s formal alliances and military partnerships are thin. And Russia’s strategic priority is surely its western flank.

And how much of its top-shelf technology would Russia be willing to share with North Korea? Creating alliances and integrating forces takes decades of effort, even among the most trusting of partners. Trust and friendship would not seem a natural state for autocrats.

Identifying China’s calculation in this altered landscape is critical. Since 1948, Pyongyang has held its giant neighbour – with which it enjoys its only other formal mutual defence pact – at a wary distance.

Ultimately, China alone will have the power and sway to impact meaningfully – for better or worse – on the renewed marriage of convenience between Russia and North Korea.

Yes, we should be worried by the new Russia–North Korea pact. These are two weakened, nuclear weapons-capable despotic powers. And China holds important trump cards with both. If we cannot read the calculus being worked through in Beijing, our concern should increase.