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# White Support for Racial Referenda in the Deep South

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*This research examines two referenda in the Deep South, both of which can be categorized as antiblack. Specifically, we analyze a 2001 Mississippi flag referendum (in which the electorate rejected a new flag and retained the old state flag containing a Confederate insignia) and a 2004 referendum in Alabama (in which citizens voted to retain unenforceable constitutional language requiring separate educational facilities for black and white students, and a poll tax on voting). Using state election returns and Census data, we employ weighted least squares regression to analyze voting patterns. The results reveal that across both states, white voters displayed significantly greater "antiblack" voting behavior in those areas with larger black populations and more urbanized environments. Our findings pose a direct challenge to both those who insist that the "racial threat" perceived by whites is diminishing and those who hold that urbanization will ultimately be corrosive of racist attitudes and behavior.*

**Keywords:** Parties, Elections, Voting, Race, Ethnicity.

*Esta investigación examina dos referendos en el sur de Estados Unidos, cada uno de ellos puede ser categorizado como anti afroamericano. Específicamente, se analizó el referendo en 2001 a la bandera de Mississippi (en el que el electorado rechazó una nueva bandera y decidieron conservar la bandera anterior que contenía una insignia del ejército confederado) y un referendo en 2004 en Alabama (en el que los ciudadanos votaron para conservar un lenguaje constitucional imposible de aplicar que requería separar las instalaciones educativas para*



1 revolves around the position of the Negro.” As he noted, “those whites who  
2 live in counties with populations 40, 50, 60, and even 80 percent Negro share  
3 a common attitude toward the Negro,” with such “black-belt whites” tending  
4 to be the most racially reactionary whites in the region (Key 1984, 5; see also  
5 Blalock 1956, 1957; Matthews and Prothro 1963). Key’s racial threat theory 1  
6 has been a mainstay of Southern—and, indeed, American—political analysis  
7 for decades. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1993, 284) observed, “white racial  
8 hostility is a common feature of American political life, and it frequently  
9 varies as a direct function of blacks’ presence in the population” (see also  
10 Taylor 1998). Using data from both individual and aggregate levels, Wright  
11 (1977) confirmed Key’s thesis in an analysis of the white vote for George  
12 Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. Even while arguing that the racial  
13 dimension in Southern politics has declined in recent decades, Giles and  
14 Buckner (1993, 1995) observed a strong “black-belt” effect in white  
15 Louisianans’ support for the Senate and gubernatorial campaigns of David  
16 Duke, arguably the most blatantly racist candidate for major office since  
17 George Wallace.<sup>1</sup> These findings fit into a “power model” view of politics,  
18 which stresses the likelihood of group conflict over the possibility of  
19 group cooperation. Campbell (1965), for instance, observed that whites tend  
20 to be threatened by prospects of black power, seeing it as an infringement on  
21 their social, political, and economic hegemony (see also Kinder and Sears  
22 1981). Similarly, Giles and Evans (1986, 470) argued that the nature of the  
23 political universe implies that “racial and ethnic groups . . . [are likely to be]  
24 participants in ongoing competition for control of economic, political, and  
25 social structures . . . [with] inter-group hostility and antagonism . . . natural  
26 products of that competition.”

27 Although considerable empirical evidence has been gathered in support of  
28 the racial threat theory (for a recent overview, see Baybeck 2006), the  
29 perspective is not without its critics. Many of these critiques derive from the  
30 social contact orientation, an equally venerable viewpoint that argues that  
31 interaction among members of various groups tends to lessen intergroup  
32 hostility. Studies dating back to the 1940s showed very promising impacts of  
33 racial integration on the attitudes of whites (see, e.g., Allport 1954). For  
34 instance, Stouffer and others (1949) reported that contact with blacks  
35 contributed to greater support for desegregation among white members of the  
36 American armed services, while Deutch and Collins (1951) found that whites  
37 living in integrated public housing facilities had more tolerant racial attitudes  
38 than those living in segregated housing. While subsequent studies in political  
39 psychology have suggested that numerous supportive conditions are often  
40 necessary for contact to have ameliorative effects (see Devine 1995 for a cogent

41  
42 <sup>1</sup> For similar findings focusing on Hispanics, see Tolbert and Hero (1996, 2001), and Tolbert and  
43 Grummel (2003). For an analysis focusing on gender, see South and others (1982).

1 overview of this literature), social contact has been shown to have a significant  
2 positive impact in at least some circumstances.<sup>2</sup>

3 For our purposes, the most interesting of these studies are those that have  
4 explored the intersection between minority population density and  
5 urbanization, and their interactive effect on white attitudes and behavior. Key  
6 (1984) himself speculated that the march of urbanization in the South would  
7 work to undermine racist attitudes and behaviors among whites, especially since  
8 urban environments provide opportunities for liberating forms of interaction,  
9 including fruitful class-based alliances between working-class blacks and  
10 whites.<sup>3</sup> Carsey (1995) has provided some empirical evidence of this, albeit in  
11 non-Southern environments. His analysis of data from the 1989 New York City  
12 mayoral election confirmed that white voters were more likely to support David  
13 Dinkins if they lived in precincts with higher African-American population  
14 densities. While some Southern studies (see, e.g., Giles and Buckner 1993) have  
15 challenged the generalizability of findings such as Carsey's, others have  
16 supported them. In a study directly challenging Giles and Buckner's (1993)  
17 findings, Voss (1996) reported that in parishes that are at least 75 percent urban,  
18 demographic proximity to blacks significantly decreased the likelihood of whites  
19 voting for David Duke. In a separate analysis, Voss concludes that results from  
20 a 1996 desegregation referendum in the border-South state of Kentucky actually  
21 provide evidence of a significant "reverse backlash" among white voters (Voss  
22 and Miller 2001).<sup>4</sup> That is, the strongest support for antiblack candidates and  
23 policies comes not from whites who live in close urban proximity to blacks but  
24 from suburban whites who live in more racially segregated areas. In sum, Voss  
25 (2000, 298) argues that "the 'white backlash' or 'racial threat' model of race  
26 relations no longer applies even in the Southern region from which scholars first  
27 derived it (let alone in the rest of the country, where it never amounted to  
28 much)."

29 We enter this empirical and theoretical fray to examine recent referenda in  
30 two Deep South states. Doing so permits us to extend the literature in this area  
31 in several important ways. First, we update relevant studies by Giles and  
32 Buckner (1993) and Voss (1996, 2000; Voss and Miller 2001) with data that are  
33 both more recent and more extensive. While Giles and Buckner disagree with  
34 Voss about many matters (see Giles and Buckner 1996), they all agree that racist  
35

36 <sup>2</sup>For related findings on the effect of contact with homosexuals, see Herek and Capitanio (1996)  
37 and Overby and Barth (2002).

14

38 <sup>3</sup>The "growth of cities contains the seeds of political change . . . [W]hites . . . appear to be less  
39 bound by Reconstruction tradition and free to vote without the same regard for the maintenance  
40 of the racial system that governs the whites of the rural counties with high proportions of Negro  
41 population" (673).

42 <sup>4</sup>The Kentucky referendum, which passed with more than 67 percent of the vote, called for voters  
43 to endorse a constitutional amendment that would have stripped unenforceable, segregation-era  
44 language from the state constitution that required segregated schools for black and white  
45 children, and permitted the use of poll taxes.

1 political behavior among Southern whites has decreased in recent decades.<sup>5</sup> In  
2 contrast, we believe that recent white Southern support for Confederate  
3 symbols may suggest that there are limits to the norm of racial equality and that  
4 racism may be more prevalent in the South than previously believed.<sup>6</sup> Focusing  
5 on Deep Southern states permits us to return to the context where Key  
6 originally proposed the “black-belt effect” and the region where white racism  
7 has historically been most problematic.

8 Second, our focus on referenda that involve essentially symbolic questions  
9 permits us to examine behavior that lies at the heart of current racial disputes in  
10 the United States. While Giles and Evans (1993) may be correct that explicitly 2  
11 racist candidate appeals are doomed to failure (indeed, as they note, David  
12 Duke failed in each of his campaigns for office) because they are ultimately  
13 counterproductive, conflicts over what Merelman (1994) calls “cultural capital”  
14 may be different. Since they involve issues related to “heritage” and black  
15 demands that many whites view as illegitimate (even as they view themselves as  
16 genuinely committed to racial equality) (see Mendelberg 2001), disputes over  
17 Southern historical symbols may trigger feelings of racial resentment that are  
18 more pernicious and long lasting than the actual conditions of conflict and  
19 competition that undergirded traditional articulations of the racial threat thesis.

20 Third, statewide data on referenda voting preferences allow us to update  
21 and reassess the dispute between Giles and Buckner (1993, 1996) and Voss  
22 (1996) on the conditioning effect of urbanization. If the interactive effect of the  
23 black population and urbanization continues to be significant and associated  
24 with white support for racially conservative referenda in the South, such  
25 findings would pose a challenge to Voss’ conclusions that interracial contact in  
26 urban contexts works to ameliorate racial conflict.

### 27 28 **Direct Democracy in the South**

29  
30 Before proceeding to our empirics, we will overview briefly the two  
31 statewide referenda we analyze later.

#### 32 33 **Mississippi Flag**

34 On April 21, 2001, the state of Mississippi held a referendum to choose a  
35 state flag. Voters were given the option of either retaining the state’s 107-year-  
36 old flag that included a Confederate insignia of 13 white stars on a blue “x” in  
37 a red field in the upper inside corner or endorsing a new flag featuring a blue  
38

39 <sup>5</sup> As Giles and Buckner (1996, 1179) put it, “while operative, racial threat [is] no longer a defining  
40 characteristic of Southern politics.”

41 <sup>6</sup> One reason to be skeptical of the conventional wisdom is that much of the evidence pointing to  
42 the ineffectiveness of explicitly racial appeals has come from experiments conducted in the  
43 Midwest or Northeast (see, e.g., Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002).  
44 Studies focusing on Southern participants have posited much stronger racial effects (see  
45 Hutchings, Walton, and Benjamin 2010).

1 field with concentric circles of 19 white stars surrounding a larger central white  
2 star, symbolizing Mississippi's position as the 20th state admitted to the union  
3 and based on the so-called "Bonnie Blue flag" of 1810. Voters opted to retain  
4 the old flag by a lopsided 65-35 percent margin.

5 The Mississippi flag was adopted in 1894 at the height of the Redeemer  
6 movement in the state and during one of the nadirs of racial relations. Due to a  
7 legislative oversight, the authorizing legislation for the 1894 flag was repealed in  
8 1906. This was discovered in the course of a 1993 lawsuit brought by the  
9 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which  
10 claimed that the flag represented "a vestige of slavery" that denied black citizens  
11 of constitutionally protected rights. While the state Supreme Court ultimately  
12 rejected the claim, the finding of the 1906 action left the legal status of the flag  
13 in a state of limbo. In the aftermath of the NAACP suit and facing national  
14 pressure to deal with a flag many felt offensive, then Democratic governor  
15 Ronnie Musgrove appointed a bipartisan commission charged with  
16 recommending a new state flag. As noted earlier, despite endorsements of the  
17 new flag from a number of prominent Mississippians and warnings from  
18 business leaders about the possible economic consequences, state voters soundly  
19 rejected the commission's recommendation in favor of the existing 1894 flag,  
20 retaining the Confederate symbol in the state's official banner.<sup>7</sup>

### 21 22 **Alabama Constitutional Amendment on Education**

23 In the early years of the 21st century, the state of Alabama undertook efforts  
24 to revise and update its 1901 state constitution, removing inoperative and  
25 unenforceable passages left over from the days of *de jure* segregation. In 2000,  
26 voters approved repealing portions of the constitution that prohibited  
27 interracial marriages, although roughly 50 percent of whites voted to retain the  
28 official ban. In 2003, the state legislature approved a measure to send to the  
29 voters a proposed amendment that would have rid the constitution of language  
30 requiring separate educational facilities for black and white students and that  
31 endorsed a tax on voting.<sup>8</sup>

32 Following the advice of a commission created by Governor Bob Riley, the  
33 state legislature helped to create a ballot that would repeal anachronistic  
34 provisions of the constitution. One of the provisions would have deleted Section  
35 259: "All poll taxes collected in this state shall be applied to the support of the  
36 public schools in the respective counties where collected." The amendment also

37  
38 <sup>7</sup> For research on white racial attitudes toward the Mississippi flag, see Orey (2004). 15

39 <sup>8</sup> The Alabama referendum closely resembled similar efforts in Kentucky in 1996 (see Voss and  
40 Miller 2001). The amendment read as follows: "Shall the following Amendment be adopted to the  
41 Constitution of Alabama? Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, to  
42 repeal portions of Section 256 and Amendment 111 relating to separation of schools by race and  
43 repeal portions of Amendment 111 concerning constitutional construction against the right to  
44 education, and to repeal Section 259, Amendment 90, and Amendment 109 relating to the poll  
45 tax."

1 would have deleted language allowing soldiers who had obtained honorable  
2 discharges, as well as deaf and blind citizens, to be exempted from the poll tax.  
3 The deletion of such language would have rid the Alabama constitution from all  
4 mentions of the poll tax. In addition, the amendment would also have deleted a  
5 portion of Section 256, which reads: “[s]eparate schools shall be provided for  
6 white and colored children, and no child of either race shall be permitted to  
7 attend a school of the other race.” Legislators unanimously passed the proposed  
8 language in a larger proposal known as Amendment 2, which was then put to a  
9 vote by the Alabama electorate.

10 Opponents of the amendment rallied around the language regard-  
11 ing the “right to education,” arguing that approval would establish a new  
12 state-recognized right to public education and trigger major tax increases.<sup>9</sup>  
13 In the final weeks of the campaign, prominent opponents, such as former  
14 state chief justice Roy Moore, who is famous for refusing to remove a copy  
15 of the ten commandments from his court building, and the Christian  
16 Coalition, which argued that the amendment could lead to higher taxes and  
17 grant the state autonomy over the public school system, raised the importance  
18 of the issue, even as supporters warned that the defeat of the amendment  
19 would tar Alabama as “still one of the most racist states in the nation”  
20 (Berkhalter 2004, 9). In the end, the proposed amendment failed by a slim 1  
21 percent margin, and the Alabama constitution retained its segregationist  
22 language.

### 23 24 **Data and Methods**

25  
26 Our analysis employs data collected from the relevant Secretary of State  
27 Offices and the U.S. Census Bureau. First, we use precinct-level results to  
28 estimate the white vote for each referendum, which we then aggregate by  
29 county. The *dependent variables* are white support for the Confederate flag and  
30 white opposition to changing language in the Alabama constitution requiring  
31 segregated facilities for black and white students. In multivariate analyses, we  
32 regress these aggregated estimates on a variety of independent variables that are  
33 based on county-level census data.

34 Our reliance on aggregated data confronts us with the possibility of  
35 committing the “ecological fallacy” of drawing false inferences regarding  
36 individuals based on collective data. To reduce, if not eliminate, this  
37 aggregation bias, we use King’s (1997) ecological inference (EI) method, which

38  
39 <sup>9</sup>Alabama has one of the lowest tax rates in the nation and its citizens are sensitive to any  
40 proposal threatening to raise them. In addition, the constitution specifically earmarks over 89  
41 percent of revenue for specific purposes and prohibits the state courts from requiring state or  
42 local officials to spend more money on education without the express approval of voters (see  
43 Gewertz 2004).

**Table 1. The Ecological Inference Problem**

Race	Vote Choice		Voting Age
	Referendum A	Referendum B	Population
Black	$\lambda_i^b$	$1 - \lambda_i^b$	$X_i$
White	$\lambda_i^w$	$1 - \lambda_i^w$	$1 - X_i$
	$T_i$		$1 - T_i$

*Note:* In each precinct, noted as  $i$ , both  $X_i$  (fraction of the voting age population who are black) and  $T_i$  (fraction of the voting age population who voted in the referendum) along with  $N_i$  not shown here (the number of voting age people, not included in the table) are observed.  $\lambda_i^b$  (fraction of voting age blacks who vote) and  $\lambda_i^w$  (fraction of voting age whites who voted) are unobserved and are inferred from the aforementioned aggregate variables.

makes minimal assumptions about the data<sup>10</sup> and has been shown to be useful in previous analyses (see, e.g., Gay 2001, 2002).

Table 1 describes our ecological problem at the precinct level. EI capitalizes on the observable data available (those data in the marginal cells) and permits analysts to work their way backward to estimate unobserved values within the body of the table. In Table 1,  $X_i$  represents the fraction of the voting-age population that is black and  $T_i$  represents the proportion of the voting age population that voted for the respective referendum in the precinct. Typically, the unobserved quantities of interest would be  $\lambda_i^b$  (the proportion of blacks who voted for the referendum) and  $\lambda_i^w$  (the proportion of whites who voted in favor of the referendum). In this case, however, we are interested only in  $\lambda_i^w$  (and its associated standard errors), which we calculate using the most current version of King's EI shareware.<sup>11</sup>

### Independent Variables

The principal independent variable in our analysis is the interaction between the black population variable and the urbanization variable. The black population variable is measured as the percentage of black residents in a county. The urbanization variable is a continuous variable, recoded to range between 0 and 1, reflecting the percentage of a county that is urban based on "urban clusters" as defined by the 2000 Census. An "urban cluster" (which is defined as

<sup>10</sup> King (1997, chapter 9) outlines three key assumptions: (1) that each precinct's black and white voting percentages are drawn from a process that resembles a bivariate normal distribution where neither can rise above 100 percent or fall below 0 percent; (2) in each precinct the estimated black vote and estimated white votes are mean independent of racial density, aside from any covariates used to account for aggregation bias; and (3) after conditioning for precinct racial composition, voting is independent among precincts. Voss (2000) has argued that only the first assumption is truly critical.

<sup>11</sup> Available at <http://gking.harvard.edu>. See Liu (2007) for a recent discussion of the EI methods that have been used by scholars of voting behavior and by federal courts in voting rights cases.

1 a densely settled region with between 2,500 and 49,999 residents, typically  
2 containing at least 1,000 people per square mile) is smaller than an “urban area”  
3 (which the census defines as containing at least 50,000 residents). We opt to use  
4 “clusters” in large part because of the dearth of “urban areas” in the state of  
5 Mississippi.<sup>12</sup> The interactive term is the product of the urbanization and  
6 percent-black-residents variables. Additionally, since there were high levels of  
7 correlation between our black  $\times$  urbanization interactive terms and their  
8 component parts, we “centered” the component variables around their means  
9 prior to calculating the products (Cronbach 1987; Jaccard, Wan, and Turrisi  
10 1990), which reduces associated standard errors without affecting the 3  
11 magnitude of the interactive coefficient or the calculated slopes of the  
12 components.

13 To specify the model more fully, we also include a number of control  
14 variables measured at the county level on the right-hand side of our equations.<sup>13</sup>  
15 First, we employ the 2000 vote for George W. Bush as a proxy measure of  
16 Republicanism (see Tolbert and Hero 2001). Contra Voss (2000), we suspect  
17 that partisan context matters, even in votes such as these referenda that do not  
18 involve candidates or, explicitly at least, partisan positions. Second, consistent  
19 with Giles and Buckner’s (1993) assumption that whites socialized outside of  
20 the South will be less likely to support state-level Confederate-era symbols,  
21 we include a variable measuring white interregion immigration. Third, to test  
22 for possible class differences (perhaps based on greater competition among  
23 working-class whites with blacks for jobs), we include two class-based measures:  
24 mean per capita white income and percentage of white unemployment.

25 Fourth, following much previous work (see, e.g., Giles and Evans 1985;  
26 Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Tolbert and Grummel 2003), we expect education  
27 to have a mediating effect on white voting behavior and thus control for the  
28 percentage of those who possess less than a high school degree (see also Sidanius  
29

30 <sup>12</sup>The Census recognizes only five urbanized areas in Mississippi but 72 urban clusters. Voss  
31 (2000) contends that it is possible for blacks and whites to live in proximity to each other without  
32 ever making physical contact, i.e., to be “close without touching.” We think that is unlikely in  
33 “urban clusters.” Even in small towns, blacks and whites are likely to come into contact with one  
34 another because most possess a central business district, where blacks and whites interact on a  
35 regular basis. Even if blacks and whites are segregated residentially, for example by literal or  
36 figurative train tracks or other geographical barriers, they will encounter one another at some  
37 point. Such citizens work together and shop together even if they do not live together. In his  
38 classic 1949 treatment of Southern politics, Key (1984, 673) sets the threshold for urbanism at  
39 50,000, although he offers no rationale for this choice. Others who have addressed the importance  
40 of urbanism toward racial attitudes and behavior (see, e.g., Combs, Welch, and Hibbing 1984;  
41 Whitby 1985, 1986, 1987) usually do not offer any definition of what counts as urban, even when  
42 they include explicit variables in their models. In an era of increased suburbanization, enhanced  
43 mobility, spread of national chains, improved communications, and the like, we think it wise to  
44 define urban in a broader sense because we believe that many “urban dynamics” are likely to be  
45 seen in smaller cities today in ways that were not true in earlier eras.

46 <sup>13</sup>We follow Glaser (1994), Voss (2000), and others in focusing on counties as the most important  
47 geopolitical unit in the South.

1 *et al.* 2000). Fifth, it seems plausible that different age cohorts will have  
2 experienced different socialization experiences, with those who came of age  
3 during the Old South era more likely to support Old South symbols. To tap this,  
4 we construct a variable based on the percentage of each county's white  
5 population aged 65 or older, which should provide a rough measure of the size  
6 of the white population that came of voting age prior to the beginning of the  
7 Civil Rights era. Finally, we also use King's EI technique to estimate a measure  
8 of white turnout, which we include. Our battery of independent variables  
9 compares favorably with those used in other recent analyses (see Voss 2000).

10 We employ weighted least squares to examine white support for antiblack  
11 referenda, using the standard errors of the point estimates for the white vote by  
12 county to assign weight (see, e.g., King 1997, Table 2, 290).<sup>14</sup> Lastly, as is  
13 indicated by Table 2, all of the variables employed in this analysis are recoded  
14 from 0 to 1, save for income, which is measured as average white per capita  
15 income and the centered variables that are allowed to range from -1 to 1.

## 16 17 Findings

18  
19 We summarize our descriptive findings in Table 2. Beginning with the data  
20 from Mississippi, the story here is the near unanimous support among whites  
21 for the Confederate flag at about 87 percent. White support ranged from a low  
22 of 31 percent in rural Jefferson County to approximately 98 percent in rural  
23 Covington County. As it relates to turnout, almost half of white Mississippians  
24 turned out to vote, at roughly 48 percent. White turnout ranged from a low of  
25 approximately 23 percent in Leflore County to roughly 84 percent in Claiborne  
26 County. On average, over half of each county supported George W. Bush for  
27 president in 2000. The average unemployment rate among whites was  
28 approximately 5 percent, with a high of 10 percent and a low of nearly 2 percent.

29 Turning to the case of Alabama, according to Table 2, approximately 62  
30 percent of whites rejected the referendum to change the language in the  
31 constitution. The vote ranged from a low of 26 percent in rural Sumter County,  
32 where the black population was approximately 74 percent, to approximately 84  
33 percent in Hale County, another rural county where blacks made up roughly 59  
34 percent of the total population. The turnout among whites was somewhat low at  
35 about 36 percent. The lowest white turnout was in rural Randolph County,  
36 where the black population was roughly 22 percent. The highest white turnout  
37 was in rural Lowndes County, where the black population was approximately  
38 74 percent. The mean vote for George W. Bush was 61 percent. The lowest

39  
40  
41 <sup>14</sup> Here we caution against the potential violation of heteroskedasticity that might be associated  
42 with the significant variation in white population size across counties. These weights are also  
43 applied because the values employed for the dependent variable are themselves estimates (see  
King 1997). We use the analytic weight procedure in Stata to accomplish this task.

**Table 2. Descriptive Statistics** <sup>12</sup>

	Mississippi				Alabama					
5	Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum
6	White vote Centered	.87	.11	.31	.98	White vote Centered	.62	.12	.26	.84
7	Urban	-.002	.24	-.28	.59	Urban	.001	.26	-.3	.59
8	Centered					Centered				
9	Black population	-.001	.20	-.37	.47	Black population	.004	.22	-.27	.57
10	Centered urban ×	-.007	.05	-.13	.13	Centered urban ×	-.003	.0	-.16	.12
11	Centered black					Centered black				
12	In migration	.02	.01	.01	.07	In migration	.02	.01	.01	.06
13	White turnout	.48	.11	.23	.84	White turnout	.36	.13	.12	.77
14	Whites 65 over	.16	.03	.09	.24	Whites 65 over	.14	.02	.08	.18
15	Whites H.S.	.56	.10	.21	.71	Whites H.S.	.59	.10	.35	.74
16	Income	18,103	2,824	13,555	30,823	Income	18,811	3,446	14,489	32,923
17	Unemployment	.05	.02	.02	.1	Unemployment	.06	.02	.03	.12
18	Bush vote	.55	.13	.18	.8	Bush vote	.61	.15	.17	.81
19										
20										

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1 support for Bush was in Macon, roughly 50 percent rural and 85 percent black.  
2 The highest support for Bush came from rural Blount County, consisting of  
3 only 1 percent blacks.

4 Turning to the regression analyses, we first apply the Giles and Buckner  
5 model, whereby we do not control for an interaction between urban and black.  
6 Based on the results reported in Table 3, Model 1, for the Mississippi data, the  
7 percent-black coefficient is in the posited direction and achieves marginal  
8 significance at the .10 level, whereas the urban coefficient fails to reach statistical  
9 significance. Conversely, Model 1 for the Alabama data reveals that the black  
10 population variable fails to achieve significance, and the urban coefficient is  
11 marginally significant.

12 The results of the regression analyses with the interactions included are  
13 summarized in Table 3, Model 2. These results provide support for the racial  
14 threat hypothesis, even in urban areas. Indeed, in both Mississippi and  
15 Alabama, the combination of larger black communities and more urbanized  
16 environments contributed to stronger, not weaker, support among white voters  
17 for the measures considered here. Contrary to the notion that urbanization  
18 would ameliorate racial animosity among whites, we find no evidence of such  
19 improvement and, in fact, observe that at least under certain conditions,  
20 urbanization may exacerbate white support for racial symbols and perhaps  
21 policies.

22 In the case of Mississippi, the interaction term's effect seems to be driven  
23 largely by black population size. Using the coefficients in Model 2, we can create  
24 hypothetical scenarios. For example, when the black population variable is set  
25 at its minimum value, the effect of the urban population decreases by  
26 approximately 16 points. On the contrary, when the black population is set at its  
27 maximum value, the effect of the urban population on support for the flag  
28 increases by 21 points.

29 In the case of Alabama, somewhat different mechanisms seem to be at work,  
30 with the interactive term being driven more by its urbanism component. For  
31 example, when the percent black population takes on its lowest value, the urban  
32 effect is .06. Conversely, when the percent black is at its highest value, the urban  
33 effect decreases by  $-.12$ . In comparison with Mississippi, this makes intuitive  
34 sense, since while largely symbolic, as noted earlier, the public discourse about  
35 the Alabama referendum took on something of an antitax cast toward the end  
36 of the campaign, with leading opponents raising the specter of massive tax hikes  
37 that could follow passage of the measure. Our findings are consistent with a view  
38 that fiscal fears among white voters "in urban counties with relatively large tax  
39 bases and relatively high local tax efforts" drove some of the opposition to the  
40 measure, as more highly taxed white voters in more urban areas reacted  
41 negatively to language that at least raised the potential of higher taxes to fund  
42 better education for minority students in rural areas with historically  
43 underassessed property values (Public Affairs Research Council of Alabama  
44 1997).

**Table 3. White Support for Racial Referenda in Mississippi and Alabama**

	Mississippi		Alabama	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Urban	.09 (.06)	-.02 (.08)	.23* (.12)	.06 (.13)
Black	.25* (.15)	.15 (.15)	-.24 (.26)	-.22 (.25)
Urban × black	—	.59** (.26)	—	1.11*** (.40)
Support for Bush	.93 (.21)***	.74*** (.22)	-.12 (.38)	.003 (.36)
White high school	1.34*** (.19)	1.13*** (.19)	-1.11* (.63)	-1.16* (.60)
White unemployment	2.53*** (.61)	1.83*** (.65)	.02 (.02)	3.55*** (.02)
White income	3.06e-05 (6.14e-06)	2.41e-06 (6.601e-06)	-4.70e-06 (6.21e-06)	5.06e-06 (6.86e-06)
In migration	1.02 (1.09)	2.39** (1.10)	.64 (2.11)	2.06 (2.06)
White turnout	.35*** (.08)	.35*** (.07)	.34** (.17)	.38** (.16)
White age (>65)	-.19 (.48)	-.10 (.46)	-.29 (1.16)	-.92 (1.12)
Constant	-1.38*** (.26)	-.92*** (.27)	1.31*** (.52)	1.04** (.49)
N	82		66	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.70	.72	.12	.21

Note: \*\*\* p ≤ .01; \*\* p ≤ .05; \* p ≤ .10.

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1 The effects of some of our control variables differ somewhat across models  
2 too. Not surprisingly, white unemployment and white turnout are both  
3 associated with higher levels of support for the referenda in both states.  
4 However, partisan affiliation (as measured by support for President Bush) is  
5 significant in Mississippi but not in Alabama, perhaps signifying that the flag  
6 controversy was the type of symbolic issue that overlaps with partisanship,  
7 while the complications surrounding the education language rendered it less  
8 likely to map onto partisan identification. Education levels in the white  
9 community were significant in both models but carried opposite signs. In the  
10 case of the Mississippi flag, whites who possess lower than a high school degree  
11 were associated with greater support for the referendum, while in Alabama,  
12 education had the opposite effect.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps the most interesting effect among  
13 the control variables concerns regional immigration, which is statistically  
14 insignificant in Alabama (although positively signed) but is significant and  
15 positively signed in the Mississippi model. While we expected larger populations  
16 of whites who came from other parts of the country to be associated with less  
17 support for racial referenda, at least in Mississippi, those raised outside the  
18 South were generally more supportive of Confederate symbols, suggesting that  
19 white migrants to the region may be attracted, in part at least, by a “Southern  
20 heritage” appeal.<sup>16</sup>

### 21 22 Conclusion

23  
24 The findings reported here should give pause to those scholars who dismiss  
25 the racial threat argument as a fading anachronism of a bygone era. Our data,  
26 drawn from referenda involving a Confederate symbol and segregation-era  
27 rhetorical language in two Deep South states, reveal consistent and significant  
28 effects on white behavior based on racial context. The analysis shows that the  
29 racial threat phenomenon has its conditional effect. Most importantly given  
30 recent debates, we show not only the absence of an ameliorative urbanization  
31 effect interacting with race but that urbanization actually heightens racial voting  
32 among Southern whites in “urban clusters” with larger black populations. Ever  
33 since Key (1984), generations of observers of Southern politics have pinned  
34 great hopes on urbanization as a slow but inexorable force for racial moderation  
35 even in the Deep South and have expected Southern whites, like whites in other  
36 regions (see Carsey 1995; Voss 2000), to display less racially polarized behavior

37  
38 <sup>15</sup> We suspect that the interstate discrepancy could be driven by the fact that the Alabama  
39 referendum dealt explicitly with educational issues.

40 <sup>16</sup> This is consonant with the conclusions of a number of careful observers of the South and  
41 Southern culture, including John Shelton Reed, who noted, for instance, that “some [Northerners]  
42 even move south to be among people who think the way they think we think” (Reed 1993, 127),  
43 and Tony Horwitz, who, in his account of Civil War re-enactors, found Northerners more eager  
44 to take Confederate than union roles (Horwitz 1999, 135-137).

1 in urban settings. Our findings suggest that such hopes are at least exaggerated  
2 or premature, if not entirely misplaced.

3 To be sure, each of the interactions for both cases was significant and in the  
4 hypothesized direction. It is clear, however, that voters in the state of  
5 Mississippi possessed stronger allegiance to the state flag than Alabama voters  
6 did with respect to Jim Crow language in their state constitution. As the results  
7 indicate, Mississippi voters provided overwhelming support for the Confederate  
8 flag, whereas the Alabama referendum failed by less than 1 percent. In the case  
9 of Alabama, it appears that the framing of the vote within the context of higher  
10 taxes may have impacted the outcome of the referendum.

11 For more than 50 years, the black threat hypothesis has been a mainstay of  
12 American political analysis. Returning to the Deep South region that first  
13 prompted the development of this theory, our data indicate that even in the 21st  
14 century, racial context still exercises a profound effect on the behavior of  
15 Southern whites. In recent years, battles over competing interpretations of the  
16 region's historical symbols, whether they reflect "heritage" or "hate," have been  
17 central to the region's politics. In these regional "culture wars," white attitudes  
18 and behavior continue to be profoundly influenced by the environments in  
19 which they reside, with closer residential proximity to large black populations  
20 associated with greater manifestations of racial intolerance, or at least  
21 insensitivity.

22 While it might be tempting to dismiss these results as related only to  
23 ultimately rather insignificant symbolic matters and to take greater comfort in  
24 the findings of others (particularly Voss 1996) that racial context has less effect  
25 on more meaningful votes for elected office, we believe that would be unwise.  
26 Our findings point to the continuing virulence of racial attitudes and behavior in  
27 a part of the country that has historically struggled mightily with the legacy of  
28 slavery. As such, they caution against the comforting notion that racism has  
29 either faded from political relevance or will inevitably fade with the relentless  
30 march of urbanization and modernity. At least in the states of the Deep South,  
31 the "American dilemma" (Myrdal 1944) of racial polarization remains  
32 unresolved.

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